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RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WITHOUT A VICTIM: RISE AND 
THE ROADS NOT TAKEN 




The utility of restorative justice for victimless crimes - specifically, drink driving - was 
tested as part of the Canberra Re-Integrative Shaming Experiments (RISE), one of the 
earliest systematic trials of restorative justice. The researchers envisaged two mechanisms 
whereby restorative justice might lead to reduced reoffending even in the absence of a 
victim: a victimless variant of reintegrative shaming, and the mobilisation of the offender’s 
friends and family to exercise informal coercion over the offender.  Reviewing the 
literature on the RISE trials, this paper analyses the reasons for the failure of both these 
mechanisms to have the desired effect, identifies the ways in which restorative justice 
would need to change - both as a practice and a philosophy - in order for the two 
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Running from 1995 to 1997, the Canberra Re-Integrative Shaming Experiments (RISE) were 
one of the earliest systematic trials of restorative justice, comparing its effectiveness with 
that of a court hearing across four offence types. Only one of the four trials showed no 
measurable positive effect; this was also the only victimless offence (drink driving). While 
the researchers believed that victim-offender encounters would have a particularly strong 
effect on reoffending, it was hoped that the drink driving conferences would also show 
some effect; two alternative candidate mechanisms which could produce this were 
proposed. 
This paper reviews publicly available data on the RISE trials (project reports and 
unpublished academic work as well as published papers) to assess why neither mechanism 
appears to have functioned as its proponents anticipated. This will contribute to a better 
understanding of the conditions of success of restorative justice, and the extent to which 
it can be used in connection with drink driving and other victimless crimes. 
The paper is divided into six sections. The first identifies the anti-criminogenic mechanisms 
which the researchers expected to operate in the drink driving conferences: “victimless 
shaming” and “informal coercion” (through the mobilisation of the offender’s friends and 
family). The second section reviews the evidence of these mechanisms operating and finds 
a paradoxical picture, with both mechanisms apparently present but ineffective; the third 
and fourth sections assess the two mechanisms and ask why this was. The fifth section 
reviews more recent initiatives pursuing restorative justice in the absence of a victim and 
asks whether they have succeeded where the RISE drink driving conferences failed. The 
final section identifies the modifications to restorative justice - both as a practice and in 
theory - which would be required in order for the “victimless shaming” and “informal 
coercion” mechanisms to work as anticipated, and considers the implications of these 
changes. 
Offenders without victims: victimless shaming and Uncle Harry  
The Canberra Re-Integrative Shaming Experiments (RISE) were a set of four randomised 
controlled trials of restorative justice, focusing specifically on reintegrative shaming. 
Between 1995 and 1997, in Canberra and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), groups of 
offenders awaiting trial for four types of offences were referred in equal numbers to court 
and to a restorative conference. The four offence types were juvenile violent crime; 
juvenile property crime (personal and shoplifting); and the victimless offence of drunk 
driving. 900 drink drivers took part in RISE, 450 being referred to a restorative conference; 
this was the largest single group of offenders, although in experimental terms the sizes of 
the four offender groups were equivalent1. Data collection continued for several years 
after the court and conference hearings: the experiment’s key variable was reoffending, 
which could only be measured over a period of time after the conference or court 
 
1 The measured reoffending rate in the case of drink driving was low - 8.8% over two years (Sherman 
et al., 1998:11); assuming that this was representative, a large sample would be required in order to 
detect any treatment effect. (Post-RISE reoffending rates were 10% in years 1-2, 8% in years 3-4 
(Tyler et al., 2007:567).) 
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appearance, particularly if a court had imposed a prison sentence or other incapacitative 
sanction (e.g. a licence suspension). 
Reintegrative shaming, the main mechanism which the experimenters aimed to test, plays 
a key role in the model of restorative justice developed by John Braithwaite (a consultant 
on RISE). In summary, Braithwaite argued that criminal justice tends to shame offenders in 
stigmatising ways, labelling them as criminals rather than merely identifying their actions 
as crimes. As a result, instead of the shame attaching to a wrongful act, the offender is 
loaded with personal guilt, or at worst feels a defiant rejection of shame. Braithwaite 
argued that shaming offenders for their actions while offering them acceptance as 
individuals would be more effective in promoting repentance, which in turn would reduce 
reoffending. When an offender has admitted guilt, Braithwaite proposed replacing court 
hearings, which stage the stigmatising rejection of a convicted criminal, with rituals to 
promote contrition and stage the reintegration of repentant offenders (Braithwaite, 1989; 
Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994; Braithwaite, 1999). 
Reintegrative shaming rituals are strongly associated with an encounter between offender 
and victim. The lack of a victim in the case of drink driving put a premium on the role of 
the other participants in the conference - the community’s representative and the 
offender’s ‘supporters’. Braithwaite (1999:48) suggested that the sight of loved ones 
displaying shame on the offender’s behalf could overcome the offender’s repression of 
shame: 
When a shaft of shame is projected across the room from victim to offender, 
the offender may have a shield that deflects the shame, only to find the 
deflected shame spears through the heart of his mother who quietly sobs 
beside him.  
While this passage refers to conferences involving a victim, other conference participants 
might be able to elicit empathetic shame without a victim being present. In particular, 
they could help defuse the offender’s reactance - the defiant rejection of imposed social 
control (Brehm and Brehm, 1981) - by modelling an alternative: “when there is a collective 
reaction of nonreactance, we observe this to calm the anger of a young offender” 
(Braithwaite, 1999:57). 
As well as this process of victimless shaming, the research team expected a second 
anti-criminogenic mechanism to operate in the RISE drink driving conferences. Lead RISE 
researchers Lawrence Sherman and Heather Strang (1997a:n.p.) suggested that the 
prospect of repeated shaming (in the case of reoffending) might in itself have a deterrent 
effect, operating both directly on the offender and through pressure from their friends 
and family: 
Once the offender has put family and friends to all the trouble of attending 
the conference, they generally become committed to helping the drink 
driver avoid repeat offending. ... conferences may do a better job at 
mobilising family and friends as a deterrent to crime. 




The reference to inconveniencing family and friends was not speculative. The police force 
organising the RISE conferences required drink driving offenders each to nominate five 
‘supporters’ to attend their conference; if necessary, conferences were cancelled and 
rescheduled until a full complement of supporters was obtained (ibid.). Sherman et al. 
record that the average number of drink driving offender supporters was 5.1 for 
conferences, 0.5 for court cases (Sherman et al., 1998:86). The researchers speculated 
that this enforced mobilisation of friends and family might in turn lead on to sustained, 
longer-term mobilisation, which might complement or even replace the reintegrative 
shaming process: the offender could be restored to a law-abiding way of life through 
extended informal coercive interventions. 
This possibility was explored by Braithwaite in a series of papers. Braithwaite (1997:12) 
wrote: 
a restorative plan of action ... may include ... preventive agreements that 
draw on the capacity of many hands to prevent. Drinking mates may sign a 
designated driver agreement. Bar staff at the drinker's pub may undertake 
to call a taxi when the offender has had too much to drink. Uncle Harry may 
undertake to ensure that the car is always left in the garage on Friday and 
Saturday nights.  
The outcome agreement of a restorative conference might enlist the offender’s intimates, 
not only to assist the offender, but to intervene so as to reduce opportunities to reoffend. 
In Braithwaite’s 1999 paper cataloguing the advantages and disadvantages of restorative 
justice Uncle Harry reappears, explicitly invoked as a source of incapacitation. Informal 
coercion could be deployed, not only in the context of an outcome agreement agreed, but 
‘dynamically’, in response to breaches of an agreement. Specifically, the weekend car key 
confiscation can be escalated by a conference in response to noncompliance by 
agreement up front that the consequence of failure to hand over the car at these times is 
that Uncle Harry will take permanent possession of the car for a year (Braithwaite, 
1999:67). 
The suggestion is that mechanisms of informal coercion would have a bigger effect on 
reoffending than deterrent or incapacitatory measures imposed by a court (e.g. licence 
suspension in the case of drunk drivers). As Braithwaite wrote in 1998: 
My hypothesis is that restorative justice conference agreements attain 
higher levels of implementation than court orders precisely because they 
are agreements rather than orders. ... collective obligation based on kinship 
and credible monitoring of compliance are structured into the agreement. 
(Braithwaite, 1998:n. p.) 
Informal coercion would reduce reoffending more effectively than criminal justice, thanks 
to the greater power of informally agreed over officially imposed measures of social 
control; the power of informal but directly coercive control measures; and the 
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opportunities for informal surveillance and control afforded by social contact among 
friendship and kinship groups. 
Present but ineffective: two mechanisms in practice 
The RISE drink driving experiment was not a success: “the detected rates of drinking and 
driving remained unchanged before and after assignment to court, while they doubled 
after assignment to conferences” (Sherman, Strang and Woods, 2000:13). Noting that this 
difference dissipated after the first year post-experiment, Sherman et al. (ibid) suggest 
that it derived from the court’s power to suspend driving licences - for twelve months in 
the case of repeat offenders - which arguably has a stronger effect on a drink-driver’s 
behaviour than anything a conference can order. This being the case, “drink driving 
conferences have no chance of preventing drink driving more than court unless 
conferences are given the same power to recommend licence suspensions” (Sherman, 
Strang and Woods, 2000:14). This interpretation was endorsed by Braithwaite: “[p]erhaps 
the most likely reason for the failure of the RISE drunk driving experiment is about the 
incapacitative effects of license suspensions being available in court cases and not in cases 
assigned to the restorative justice conferences” (Braithwaite, 2001:238). 
However, this position is unsatisfactory: it is inconsistent both with the trial outcomes and 
with the claims originally made for the trial. Over and above not “preventing drink driving 
more than court”, the RISE conferences do not appear to have prevented drink driving at 
all. Even on the charitable assumption that the rise in detected reoffending following 
conferences would also have followed court appearances but for the effect of licence 
suspension, the trial suggests only that conferences were no worse - no more 
criminogenic - than a court appearance. Moreover, as we have seen, Braithwaite’s original 
suggestion was not that restorative justice would need to be supplemented by licence 
suspension, but the reverse - that restorative justice would perform better than court 
sentencing including licence suspension. 
The simplest explanation for the restorative conferences’ failure is that they did not run as 
planned. An observer found that conferences were dominated by police facilitators and 
their outcome agreements highly routinised, even “monotonous”, “constantly requiring 
offenders to perform volunteer work at particular organisations and to donate money to 
specific charities (Inkpen, 1999:95). Offenders might experience this simply as a variant 
form of sentencing: 
If a conference was well run then the offender had volunteered to do 
community work. When a conference was not well run then volunteer work 
was imposed on them and it is possible to argue that it was in fact similar to 
court imposed community service. (Inkpen, 1999:96) 
In 80 of the 84 conferences observed by Inkpen the facilitator either directed the outcome 
agreement or (in 12 cases) “bypassed the negotiation phase and simply constructed the 
outcome agreement themselves” (Inkpen, 1999:95). Nor was this simply a question of 
police officers imposing themselves; participants tended to follow the facilitator’s lead, 
and “when the participants were told that what they decided was ‘up to their 
imagination’, the most common reaction ... was silence” (Inkpen, 1999:95). In short, the 
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conferences arguably reproduced the assumptions of criminal justice by virtue of taking 
place “in the shadow of the axe” (Holtermann, 2009). Conferences were structured to 
deliver an outcome agreement committing the offender to restitutive and rehabilitative 
action, and consequently did not promote shaming; the kind of reintegrative encounter 
which might bring offenders to a new perspective on the offending behaviour was an 
optional extra. 
As for “Uncle Harry”, accounts differ on whether any interventions of this type took place. 
While his specific examples are couched in hypothetical terms (“may undertake”, “will 
make sure”, etc), Braithwaite refers repeatedly to the RISE conferences; contrasting 
court-mandated licence suspension with a variety of “alternative modalities of 
incapacitation” (with “Uncle Harry” invoked once again), Braithwaite and Roche wrote in 
2001 that “[w]e have seen all these forms of active incapacitation negotiated at 
restorative drunk driving conferences” (Braithwaite and Roche, 2001:71). Sherman 
(2000:276) commented similarly, if more cautiously: 
offenders' families often make explicit undertakings to prevent the offender 
from driving after drinking in the future ...What lacks empirical evidence so 
far is a test of the effectiveness of these promises. 
Conversely, Inkpen’s (1999) account makes no reference to any such intervention. More 
recently, Strang (2020) has noted that the training received by the RISE police facilitators 
did not cover eliciting ‘Uncle Harry’ interventions, and that these - accordingly - were not 
observed). It is possible that the more positive statements related to earlier drink driving 
conferences rather than those forming part of the RISE trial (Braithwaite, 2020). 
However, there is evidence that the mechanisms intended to produce ‘victimless shaming’ 
and ‘informal coercion’ did, in fact, operate. A survey administered to offenders, 
measuring 17 components of reintegrative shaming, found 15 components with 
statistically significant differences, all suggesting that reintegrative shaming was 
experienced in conference more than in court (Sherman et al., 1998:129-30). As compared 
to court observers, conference observers recorded “higher levels of emotional power in 
the description of the act, the offender’s response to this description, their level of 
emotional engagement, and degree of discomfort”; offenders faced “higher levels of 
disapproval towards drink driving in general and their particular offence ... [but] were 
three times more likely to be treated by their supporters as someone they loved”; 
expressions of approval for the offender were “twice as likely to occur in a conference 
over court” (Sherman et al., 1998:89,99).  
Subsequent analysis by Tyler et al. (2007) supports this picture of a real but weak shaming 
effect. Tyler et al. found that RISE drink driving conference attenders were slightly more 
likely than court attenders to believe that they had experienced procedural justice, 
reintegrative shaming or both,2 and significantly more likely to believe that their 
 
2Perceived experience of procedural justice was a construct including beliefs about the justice of 
police conduct and the legitimacy of the law; the experience of reintegrative shaming included 
integration, shaming and the perception that rule breaking would cause interpersonal problems 
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conference or court experience would help them avoid reoffending;3 this belief in turn had 
a strong negative association with recidivism. The researchers argue that “the 
psychological dynamics identified by procedural justice and reintegrative shaming models, 
when either one is activated, lead to reductions in reoffending” (Tyler et al., 2007:572). No 
correlation was found between conference attendance and reduced reoffending, 
however; evidently the psychological effect produced was not “a strong-enough effect to 
impact behaviour” (Tyler et al., 2007:571). 
There is also some evidence for an ‘Uncle Harry’ effect, insofar as conference attenders 
were more likely to feel that the conference/court experience had “made them more 
proud of their family, brought their family closer together and ‘increased the respect we 
have for one another in my family’”; conference offenders were also more likely to believe 
that reoffending would cause problems with family and friends (Sherman et al., 1998:138). 
The researchers anticipated that this reassertion, or rebuilding, of social ties would 
promote the emergence of informal coercion: “certain kinds of family solidarity are 
strengthened (which in turn ought to enhance informal control capacities)” (Sherman et 
al., 1998:138). 
The RISE drink driving conferences thus present a paradoxical picture. Both victimless 
shaming and the preconditions for informal coercion seem to have been experienced, and 
yet lower reoffending failed to materialise. Two main groups of explanations for this 
paradoxical state of affairs will be considered, corresponding to the two main mechanisms 
suggested. 
Understanding an absence, 1: in search of victimless shaming 
The weakness of the RISE conferences’ shaming effect is illuminated by Harris’s (2001) 
study, developing on work done as part of the RISE team (Harris and Burton, 1997). Harris 
found that, contrary to the theory on which the conferences had been predicated, RISE 
drink driving offenders did not distinguish between experiences of act-based shame and 
personal guilt; moreover, they did not see reintegration and stigmatisation as opposites, 
but as qualities either or both of which might be present (Harris, 2001:152). 
The key distinction identified by Harris was between “Shame-Guilt” and “Unresolved 
Shame” - although these, unlike the other pairings, were not mutually exclusive (Harris, 
2001:117). Shaming can be resolved by the person being shamed adopting a penitent 
attitude: the “threat to identity” posed by shaming is removed through “the realignment 
of behaviors and ethical values” (Harris, 2001:186). This in turn leads to the uncomfortable 
but bearable state of Shame-Guilt, which “involves acknowledging wrongdoing and is 
associated with empathy for those hurt” (Harris, 2006:343). If the offender is unable or 
unwilling to realign their values as required, however, the result is the state of Unresolved 
 
(Tyler et al., 2007:566). 
3Tyler et al. (2007) give this belief the label of ‘legitimacy’; however, it was tested with the two 
statements “The conference/court case will keep you from breaking the law in the future” and 
“What happened in the conference/court case will encourage you to obey the law in the future.” 
(Tyler et al., 2007:582), and does not directly correspond to any belief about the legitimacy of the 
court or conference process. 
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Shame, associated with “uncertainty regarding the offense and the legitimacy of shaming” 
(Harris, 2001:173). As Unresolved Shame cannot remove the threat to identity posed by 
shaming, it effectively preserves and perpetuates it. Braithwaite and Braithwaite 
(2001b:318) relate this state to the “perseveration with shame” discussed by Ahmed 
(2001:233-40) - a compulsive and perpetually unresolved oscillation between self-blame 
and blaming others. Harris (2001:206) concludes that reoffending will be more likely 
where an offender feels low Shame-Guilt and high Unresolved Shame. 
The failure of the RISE drink driving conferences may thus derive from a counter-
productive success in inducing Unresolved Shame, rather than Shame-Guilt (to use Harris’s 
terms). The observed factors which promote Shame-Guilt rather than Unreserved Shame, 
Harris (2001:171-2) argues, were respect felt by the offender for those attempting to 
induce shame and a pre-existing belief that the offence was wrong, making it more likely 
that shaming will resonate. 
Multiple sources suggest that the desired combination of shaming and respect was not 
achieved at the drink driving conferences: the participants whom offenders respected 
were not the people who tried to shame them, and vice versa. Instead, supporters offered 
‘their’ offender unconditional support, undermining the effect of the conference. Inkpen 
(1991:91) notes that supporters were encouraged to “see themselves as citizens as much 
as supporters”, but adds that “[w]hen offenders brought along friends, or as facilitators 
often called it, their ‘giggle gang’, it was very difficult to get the supporters to realise their 
dual role.”  
Sherman and Strang (1997b: n. p.) had anticipated that community representatives might 
provide the “counterweight” to over-supportive offender supporters; Braithwaite 
(1999:52), suggested that an offender’s law-neutralizing friends might be counterbalanced 
by “law-abiding citizens who also enjoy the respect and trust of the offender”, and urged 
“efforts to recruit exemplars of virtue, grace, Mana” (1999: 25) to fill this role. 
Unfortunately, the community representatives present at the RISE conferences often 
seem to have been imbued less with ‘grace’ than with a conventional, censorious morality: 
“[t]he word ‘scolding’ ... describes what community representatives often did” (Sherman, 
2003:21). Compared to court sessions, “drink driving conferences possessed significantly 
greater amounts of stigmatising shaming”; “disapproval of the offender as a person” and 
“moral lecturing” were twice as likely to occur, and (perhaps unsurprisingly) “conference-
assigned offenders possessed a higher level of defiance” (Sherman et al., 1998: 102, 103). 
One particularly striking finding is that detected reoffending did not increase - in fact may 
have decreased - among the small minority of offenders whose conferences were not 
attended by a community representative (Sherman and Strang, 2007:74). While the size of 
the numbers involved suggests caution, 4 these results certainly do not support the thesis 
that the presence of a community representative would help reduce reoffending.  
 
4 A community representative attended 86% of conferences (Tyler et al., 2007:561). By extension, 
only 14% of the 450 offenders attended a conference without a community representative - 63 
people, five or six of whom could normally have been expected to reoffend within two years. At this 
sample size and with this effect magnitude, any but a very substantial treatment effect would be 
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Value consensus was also lacking in many conferences: in some cases multiple participants 
did not agree in principle that drink driving was a problem, let al.one that the offender’s 
own conduct was wrong. In practice, this cemented the counter-productive division 
between those participants who shamed the offender and those offering acceptance. This 
acceptance did, ironically, offer one form of compensation for the conferences’ overall 
failure. One way to resolve the contradiction posed by Unresolved Shame is in favour of 
oneself, “by not feeling shame at all” (Harris, 1999:198); the offender supporters who 
minimised the wrongness of drink driving, although they guaranteed the failure of the 
conference, did make it more tolerable in the short term, leaving the offender 
“unburdened from Unresolved Shame as a result of entanglement with the criminal 
process” (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001b:318).  
In short, victimless shaming failed to take place because offenders were largely not 
induced to feel Shame-Guilt but only (at most) Unresolved Shame, owing to a lack of 
mutual respect and value consensus. Under these conditions, Harris suggests, it may be 
possible to induce shame per se, but the offender is likely to get stuck - and perseverate - 
in a state of Unresolved Shame, rather than progressing to the Shame-Guilt which is 
conducive to reduced reoffending. Harris’s argument supplements Tyler et al.’s diagnosis 
of imperfectly executed reintegrative shaming, while also suggesting revisions to 
Braithwaite’s earlier model of restorative justice (discussed and developed in Braithwaite 
and Braithwaite 2001a, Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001b).  
Understanding an absence, 2: in search of Uncle Harry 
The trouble with Uncle Harry, as far as the RISE conferences were concerned, was that - 
although the conditions appear to have been right - the mechanisms of informal coercion 
which he represents did not function. Braithwaite touched on this secondary anti-
criminogenic mechanism in 2001, in a sole-authored paper and a book chapter 
co-authored with Valerie Braithwaite. Recalling Sherman and Strang’s argument from 
inconvenience (Sherman and Strang 1997a:n.p.), the Braithwaites argue that restorative 
justice’s combination of informality and official endorsement makes it well suited for 
addressing both drink driving and the compulsive behaviour (problem drinking) which 
arguably underlies it, particularly by mobilising family members: 
A ritual in which trouble with the police has to be dealt with is a unique opportunity for a 
family member who wishes to make an issue of an underlying alcohol problem. The 
seriousness and family shame of trouble with the police can motivate the confrontation of 
a touchy matter which has been swept under the carpet many times before. (Braithwaite 
and Braithwaite, 2001a:65) 
“Unfortunately,” the Braithwaites note, “the police in Canberra were somewhat 
discouraging of this kind of confrontation” (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001a: 65). In 
some cases observed by Braithwaite “a mother or other loved one ... was deeply 
concerned about the effect that excessive drinking was having on the life of the offender 
and the family and ... wanted to talk about this” (Braithwaite, 2001:239). However, “when 
the conference would begin to struggle with confronting an underlying alcohol problem”, 
 
indistinguishable from statistical error.  
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the police convenor would often shut down the discussion, maintaining “that the offense 
was drink driving, not drinking, and ‘drinking problems are not police business’” 
(Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001a:65). Inkpen (1999) records similar attitudes, rising on 
occasion to outright denial. In one conference, in which the offender had admitted to 
being an alcoholic, the facilitator even challenged suggestions that the outcome 
agreement should address the offender’s alcohol problem (“‘No alcohol at all? Surely he 
can have the occasional drink!’” (Inkpen 1999: 96-7)). 
In short, Uncle Harry and other friends and relations would have swung into action, 
offering informal coercion of problem drinkers, had the police not stood in their way. 
Needless to say, this interpretation is highly speculative. Braithwaite also suggests that the 
RISE conferences’ failure to tackle problem drinking may itself explain their failure to 
reduce reoffending: “The worst patterns of drunk driving arise in the lives of people who 
are chronically under the influence of alcohol. ... A criminal justice program that fails to 
confront the substance abuse problem that underlies these, the worst cases of repeat 
offending, is bound to have a limited effect on repeat offending” (Braithwaite, 2001:239-
40). Observers considered more than one in six of all conference offenders to have a 
possible drug or alcohol problem (Sherman et al., 1998:112); this relatively low incidence 
of alcohol problems may have been strongly represented among repeat offenders, given 
the even lower incidence of reoffending. Braithwaite goes further, however, suggesting 
that large-scale repeat offending by a hard core of alcohol dependent recidivists explains 
the reoffending data. Without any directly relevant data to support it, this interpretation 
must be considered speculative. 
Restorative justice, victimless shaming and Uncle Harry: strange 
bedfellows? 
Many would agree that the “underlying principle” of restorative justice is “that crimes 
‘belong’ to victims just as much as they do to offenders” (Daniels, 2013:314), and that “it 
is questionable whether a justice system in which victims rarely participate can be said to 
be truly ‘restorative’” (O’Mahony and Doak, 2014:498). The three successful RISE trials, 
and extensive experimental data from subsequent trials (see e.g. Shapland et al., 2006), 
speak volumes for the efficacy of restorative justice considered as a process centred on a 
controlled encounter between offender and victim. The interest of the fourth RISE trial lies 
in the failure of anti-criminogenic processes to develop in the absence of a victim, and 
particularly in the type of additional mechanisms - extensions to the core model of 
restorative justice - that had to be presupposed in order to envisage those processes. If 
these extensions are a poor fit to the core model, this in turn may tell us something about 
the nature of ‘core’ restorative justice. 
Victimless shaming, as we have seen, required pre-existing value consensus and mutual 
respect among participants; this raises the question of how these properties are to be 
ensured. Where no community representatives can be found who can combine shaming 
with holding the offender’s respect, Braithwaite suggests, the search should be continued 
until they are found; at one point he suggests repeating conferences over a period of 
years, so as to give the offender’s peers the time to ‘age out’ of offending (Braithwaite, 
1999:51). Value consensus should also be engineered through the “undominated 
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empowerment” of loved ones who want to broaden the conference agenda in appropriate 
ways (Braithwaite, 2001:239).  
Citing Habermas’s concept of ‘undominated dialogue’, Braithwaite had argued that value 
consensus could be left to emerge of its own accord. Given a “moral fact of the matter” 
regarding the wrongness of a particular offence, “undominated dialogue will converge on 
consensus” - and “the fact of the matter is that most criminal offenses brought to justice 
in democratic societies ... are unambiguously wrong to most citizens attending a 
conference” (Braithwaite, 1999:50). Indeed, it may be the case that “restorative justice 
might only work with crimes that ought to be crimes”; “[i]f a group of citizens cannot 
agree in an undominated conference that an act ... is wrong, then the [act] should not be a 
crime” (Braithwaite, 1999:50). A ‘failed’ conference, in other words, may in reality be no 
more a failure than an unconditional discharge represents a ‘failed’ court case; both might 
do justice precisely by declining to impose any sanction on an individual who had been 
found not to deserve it. 
In the case of drink driving, however, Braithwaite does not consider the possibility of 
letting supportive ‘offender supporters’ contribute to the dialogue. Indeed, he sees drink 
drivers’ supporters as “[d]rinking mates, who often themselves had serious alcohol 
problems” and were partially responsible for the failure of conferences (Braithwaite, 
2001:239). The presence of drink drivers’ supporters is valued only to the extent that they 
voice the moral conscience that they share with the offender; if they fail to do so their 
presence is itself seen as a form of ‘domination’, disempowering people whose voices 
should have been heard instead of theirs. It seems that the “moral fact of the matter” may 
be more apparent to an observer (or the conference facilitators) than to the conference 
itself. Consequently, what is required is not genuinely undominated dialogue but the 
selective empowerment and disempowerment of different members of the conference, so 
as to ensure that reliable upholders of the criminal law and conventional social morality 
can drown out any dissenting voices. 
In short, victimless reintegrative shaming can only be guaranteed to deliver if the 
restorative justice process is reshaped into a process for giving moral gravity and 
community endorsement to the pre-existing judgment of the criminal justice system (or its 
more enlightened elements). Where restorative justice is implemented as a form of 
diversion from trial, as in the RISE drink driving conferences, this amounts to conflating 
the community’s moral conscience with the judgment of the police. It would be no 
surprise if, as Inkpen suggested, many offenders saw their outcome agreements as 
indistinguishable from a sentence handed down in court. 
The second theoretical extension involved the reduction of reoffending through the 
mobilisation of informal coercion. In this model community disapproval is expressed 
through incapacitatory coercion by the offender’s family and friends; where this failed to 
emerge, Braithwaite argues, the blame lay with police facilitators who actively prevented 
friends and relations from intervening as they would have wished. The answer was for 
restorative justice to be taken, and take itself, more seriously - with “a depth of communal 
empowerment and some serious back-up of state resources” (Braithwaite, 2001:242). 
Rather than silence the concerned mother, the police should encourage her to bring both 
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moral and coercive pressure to bear on her errant child, letting it be known that any 
informal sanction she wanted to exert could be imposed with the backing of the criminal 
justice system. 
This model assumes a lack of agency on the offender’s part which - oddly - would make 
him or her ineligible for reintegrative shaming. An offender who can be successfully 
shamed and reintegrated is a competent moral agent, operating at the base level of 
Braithwaite’s pyramid (Braithwaite, 2002:20-21); such a person would not need to be 
physically restrained from reoffending. The underlying model - made explicit in 
Braithwaite’s speculation on the contribution of problem drinkers to drink driving figures - 
is the offender as addict. Drink driving is framed not as the reckless choice of an illegal and 
potentially dangerous behaviour, but as the effect of a larger “underlying alcohol 
problem” (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001a:65; emphasis added). More generally, 
offending is interpreted as a compulsively repeated pattern of behaviour arising from an 
underlying problem over which offenders have no control, making them incapable of 
controlling their actions. 
It is this unseen problem, inferred from a pattern of habitual anti-social behaviour, which 
informal coercion is best placed to disrupt. Consequently, if Uncle Harry is to be mobilised, 
the offending behaviour and the offender need to be understood in these terms. But if 
offenders are understood as being in the grip of an unseen underlying problem, they 
cannot be trusted to work their own reformation, nor can conferences be trusted reliably 
to identify the key issue. To deal with offending understood in these terms through 
restorative justice requires squaring the circle: restorative outcome agreements are 
agreed with offenders, but how can offenders agree an appropriate agreement if their 
behaviour is driven by problems of which they know nothing? Once again, restorative 
justice in the absence of a victim seems to entail the imposition of a moral judgment on 
the offender - this time backed up by (informal) coercion. 
The theoretical afterlife of “Uncle Harry” is instructive. Smith and Vanstone suggest that 
probation officers could usefully “begin to make more focused sense of family 
intervention and mobilize Braithwaite’s archetypal Uncle Harry” (Smith and Vanstone, 
2001:824). Similarly, McAlinden uses Uncle Harry as a positive example of the kind of 
“networks of support and control” in which communities can enmesh sexual offenders 
(McAlinden, 2005:386). Gal invokes Uncle Harry, in his dynamic role, in the context of child 
protection, arguing that relatives are better than professionals both at generating 
“creative, holistic and practical plans” and at monitoring their implementation (Gal, 
2015:42). It is noticeable that, in two of these three cases, offenders would generally be 
considered less than fully morally responsible. 
Writers on restorative justice have been less enthusiastic, however. Dignan, in the context 
of juvenile offending, cites “the authoritarian ‘Uncle Harry’” as a reminder that “families 
are not necessarily the most effective guarantors of ‘fair outcomes’” (Dignan, 2002:175). 
Hudson characterises the “enlistment of community as a resource for incapacitating 
offenders” as an “extension of control [which] has no clear limits”, and cautions that the 
community enlisted might be “a coercive community rather than [a] community of care” 
(Hudson, 2003:89). Geeraets cites Uncle Harry as an example of community-driven social 
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control and notes that, unlike a criminal sentence, “the control the community exercises 
... may last a lifetime” (Geeraets, 2016:279), while Ashworth cautions against “raging 
deterrent and incapacitative strategies, with rogue elements like Uncle Harry calling the 
shots” (Ashworth 2002: 590). 
Braithwaite (2020) for his part has offered two significant correctives to the critical 
readings cited above. Referring to ‘Uncle Harry moments’, Braithwaite stressed that 
informal coercion and surveillance would normally only be applied as a supplement to the 
terms of an outcome agreement; an example would be a conference agreeing that the 
offender should attend a training course and a relative undertaking to ensure that he or 
she did so. Braithwaite also emphasises the contestability of the shaming process, by the 
offender not least: if any restorative conference did prevail on the offender to agree terms 
that he or she found unfair, a subsequent conference could and should convene and agree 
an alternative - or, if no alternative could be agreed, refer the offender to the criminal 
justice system. While welcome, these clarifications do not entirely dispel the concerns 
raised above. 
Restorative justice without victims: does practice trump theory? 
While restorative justice is not widely used to deal with drink driving, its use on a range of 
crimes and disputes has proliferated over the last quarter-century with the growth of 
‘community’- and ‘neighbourhood’-based forms of justice and dispute resolution. In 
England and Wales, restorative justice can be seen in restorative cautions (Hoyle, Young 
and Hill, 2002), neighbourhood justice panels (Turley et al. 2014) and referral order panels 
(Stahlkopf, 2009); in Northern Ireland, in restorative cautioning (O’Mahony and Doak, 
2004) and pre-sentencing youth conferences (Campbell 2006); and in offender reparation 
panels in Ireland (McStravick, 2018). Most of these routinely take place in the absence of a 
victim, and many include victimless crime in their remit. Another, US-based exemplar - the 
Victim Impact Panel - specifically addresses drink driving (Joyce and Thompson, 2017). Do 
the theoretical concerns raised above shed any light on problems faced by these practical 
initiatives - or are they avoiding the pitfalls that undermined the RISE drink-driving 
conferences? 
On closer inspection, most of these initiatives are more victim-centric than might appear. 
Neighbourhood justice panels may avoid the terms ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ in favour of 
alternatives such as ‘harmed’ and ‘harmer’, and may process some cases on a ‘no blame’ 
basis (Turley et al., 2014:8,5); however, the default assumption remains that one person’s 
actions have affected another adversely. The low level of victim involvement in referral 
order panels is a constant in the literature, but it is repeatedly instanced as a failing rather 
than being seen as a feature (Earle, Newburn and Crawford, 2003:143; Stahlkopf, 
2009:238; Newbury, 2011:254; Hoyle and Rosenblatt, 2016:39). The non-participation of 
victims is also noted as a problem for restorative cautioning in Northern Ireland 
(O’Mahony and Doak, 2014:498) and (with qualifications) for offender reparation panels in 
Ireland (McStravick, 2018:118). 
Crucially, the absence of a victim is seen as limiting the extent to which shame can reliably 
be induced in the offender:  
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In the victim’s absence, panel members often tried to make a victim out of 
someone in the room ... Panel members also “produced” victims in cases of 
“victimless” crimes ... None of the young people appeared to be convinced 
by this (Hoyle and Rosenblatt, 2016:39) 
The attempted construction of an emotionally compelling victim scenario - generally with 
limited success - has also been observed in restorative cautioning in England (Goold and 
Young, 1999:135) and offender reparation panels in Ireland (McStravick, 2018:113). 
As in the case of the RISE drink-driving conferences, where direct victim-offender 
interaction is absent, mutual respect and value consensus are all the more important - and 
hard to ensure. In the case of referral order panels, “[m]ost respondents considered the 
panel members to be ... out of touch with the lives of the young people before them” 
(Stahlkopf, 2009:239). Indeed, this dissociation between offenders and panel members 
may have been by choice: “[f]ar from community members being part of a geographical 
community shared with the young offender, many choose to serve as a panel member in a 
neighboring area ... to reduce the chances of knowing the young offenders.” (Hoyle and 
Rosenblatt, 2016:41). 
Nor can value consensus be assumed: shaming, contrition and apologies could not 
reasonably be expected “where the offender has admitted to behaviour which ... is not 
considered to be immoral or harmful” (Hoyle, Young and Hill, 2002:32). Offending 
behaviour was more likely to be considered harmless in the absence of a victim who could  
attest to the harm that had been done. In Northern Ireland, both restorative cautioning 
conferences and pre-sentence youth conferences have had some success using surrogate 
victims (‘victim representatives’); however, O’Mahony and Doak (2004: 491, 498) note 
that the surrogates’ testimony “lacked emotional impact” and that “there were very few 
occasions where an immediate, direct apology could be given and accepted”. Campbell et 
al.’s (2006:76) evaluation of pre-sentence conferences is more positive - “there was a high 
rate of apology from young people whether or not a victim attended” - but they note that 
apologies were more forthcoming when a victim was present: “young people indicated 
that they did not apologise for various reasons including that, ‘the actual victim wasn’t 
there’ and that, ‘the crime was victimless’”. Victimless crimes posed a particular problem, 
with one offender puzzled by the idea of an offence against the ‘general public’; the police 
officer attending eventually advised the offender to apologise to a senior officer (Campbell 
et al., 2006:77). 
Lastly, two unusual but successful approaches to victimless restorative justice can be 
considered. One is the use of surrogate victims in the Victim Impact Panel (VIP) process 
discussed by Rojek, Coverdill and Fors (2006). This involves bringing offenders convicted 
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) together with a group of victims of drunk 
driving, each of whom tells his or her story. The immediate emotional effect of this 
encounter is undeniable - “[i]t was not uncommon to see panellists and DUI offenders 
weeping during VIP sessions” (Rojek, Coverdill and Fors, 2006:1324) - and its impact on 
recidivism is at least suggestive (Rojek, Coverdill and Fors, 2006; Joyce and Thompson, 
2017). 
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However, offenders are not confronted with victims of their actions, nor do victims meet 
‘their’ offender. Rather, victims are asked to witness to the harms which can follow from a 
victimless crime; in return, offenders are asked to imagine their own victimless offence as 
having culminated in a similar harm, and to mend their ways so as to keep this imaginary 
crime becoming a reality. Whether this qualifies as restorative justice is debatable. The 
complex articulation of past and present characteristic of restorative justice - the offender 
takes responsibility for the harm he or she caused in the past, the victim offers acceptance 
to the offender in the present - is remade as an exchange of reimagined pasts (“it wasn’t 
you, but it could have been”) and threatening futures (“I didn’t do it, but I could do if I’m 
not careful”). 
An alternative approach is exemplified by offender reparation panels in Ireland. Working 
with the offender, McStravick (2018: 104) argues, the panel builds a meso-level 
‘reparation community’; “theoretically thinner relational bonds between the offender and 
criminal justice professionals, programme members and local volunteers came to 
represent, in reality, the thicker bonds more expected between family members and close 
friends”. While regretting the lack of victim participation on restorative principles, 
McStravick (2018: 116) concedes that this “might actually be improving conditions for the 
meso-community of care and concern to flourish” by allowing a tighter focus on the 
offender. Significantly, when panel members did try to compensate for the absence of the 
victim by constructing victim scenarios, this was associated with greater punitiveness 
(McStravick, 2018: 113). Conceived in part as a restorative justice initiative, the panels 
seem to function as a forward-looking, welfarist alternative to restorative as well as 
criminal justice. 
Conclusion 
Twenty years on, the RISE drink driving trial remains a rich source of evidence on the 
nature of the restorative justice process. Given an experiment designed to exhibit 
particular mechanisms, it is worth asking why those mechanisms did not manifest (or else 
did not have the causal effect anticipated) under the given conditions. Identifying possible 
answers to this question in turn can help us understand under what conditions those 
mechanisms could be made to function as required. Understanding how not to do 
something - and why not - is an essential step on the way to understanding how it should 
be done. 
When reintegrative shaming is conducted without a victim of crime, the RISE data suggest, 
the free deliberation of the community is liable to be replaced by a foregone conclusion, 
and an offender’s unplanned encounter with shame supplanted by officially-endorsed 
shaming. When informal surveillance and coercion are deployed to prevent reoffending, 
on the other hand, the offender is liable to be understood not as the moral actor 
envisaged by restorative justice but as a compulsive recidivist, and the offence understood 
not as an anti-social action but as one outcropping of a larger pattern of problematic 
behaviour. In both cases, the restorative conference itself becomes secondary, serving not 
to arrive at its own judgments but only to give the seal of approval to judgments already 
made by police officers and other professionals. 
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The RISE drink driving data thus furnishes strong arguments for restricting the scope of 
restorative justice to crimes where a victim is willing to participate - and these arguments 
have not been disproved by the equivocal success of subsequent exercises in victimless 
restorative justice. The negative results of the RISE drink driving trial are eloquent 
testimony to the power - and the necessity - of the encounter between victim and 
offender, and the crucial role played by the victim in defining the moral weight of the 
offence. Conversely, extending restorative justice beyond this encounter - whether by 
attempting to implement it within the encounter between the offender and the police, or 
by invoking it as justification for informal incapacitatory measures - appears both 
unproductive and undesirable. 
Dr Philip Edwards is a Lecturer and researcher in criminology & sociology at Manchester 
Metropolitan University, specialising in issues around terrorism and anti-social behaviour.  
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